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Abstract
Available empirical evidence on the significance of the (micro) risk-taking channel of monetary
policy is not sufficient to indicate a threat to financial stability. This research has the objective of
determining whether conventional and unconventional monetary policies have resulted in
systemic risk-taking. To that end, it uses statistical measures that capture systemic risk in the
banking sector of the euro area in all its forms allowing for the time-varying non-linearities and
feedback effects typical of financial markets. The methodology is a structural factor-augmented
vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model. The main result is that there is systemic risk-taking in the
euro area banking sector. It takes the form of an increase in the banking sector’s vulnerability via
contagion and interconnectedness. Banks’ balance sheets, however, do not account for the full
transmission from (micro) risk taking to systemic risk-taking confirming the importance of
accounting for time-varying non-linearities and feedback effects. The main policy implication is
that persistently accommodative monetary policy geared toward preserving price stability may
face a trade-off with financial stability. In that case, monetary policy will require coordination with
macro-prudential policy.
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1. Introduction
“Despite bouts of volatility – linked to rising geopolitical tensions and weak economic data – a search for yield has
persisted across global financial markets. The price of risk has remained low in most market segments, supported by
historically low risk-free rates and measures of market volatility. This has been associated with an increased correlation
within and across euro area bond, equity and money markets reminiscent of the years before the onset of the global
financial crisis.”, Financial Stability Review, p. 8, November 2014, ECB.
“There is no broad-based evidence of excessive risk-taking by banks in response to profitability
pressures.”…”Increased risk-taking and common asset exposures have rendered a larger part of the euro area nonbank financial sector vulnerable to a potential shock in global financial markets.”, Financial Stability Review, p. 84, May
2018, ECB.

The European Central Bank (ECB) has been stressing for several years that the persistent low
interest rate environment required for its monetary policy objectives induces risk-taking by
financial institutions in monetary and capital markets and may affect financial stability negatively.
More broadly, the significant increase in central banks’ balance sheets as a result of
unconventional monetary policies in the post-Lehman era have drawn attention to the risk-taking
channel of monetary policy in policy circles and academia. In fact, the role of risk taking in
monetary policy formulation precedes the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) as it is even part and
parcel of the discussion on its causes. Some observers (e.g. Borio and White, 2003, Rajan, 2006,
Issing, 2011) consider that low real interest rates were partly to blame for the GFC as they fueled
an asset price boom during which financial institutions increased leverage and took risk not fully
compensated by higher risk premia. However, this view is not unanimous, and several other
observers disagree (e.g. Caballero et al, 2008, Bernanke, 2009 and Svensson, 2011). This camp
considers that the main cause of the GFC was an excess of savings over investment as a result
of the export-promoting policies of China and its entry into the World Trade Organization, aging
in advanced economies and a dearth of investment opportunities. Clearly, disagreement over past
monetary policymaking affects the future of monetary policy frameworks’ objective setting. For
the first group, the formulation of monetary policy should take financial stability considerations
into account while for the second group monetary policy should continue to concentrate on price
stability and macro-prudential policy should ensure financial stability.
Ex-post Lehman, with the advent of macro-prudential policy, the risk-taking channel of monetary
policy has taken a new spin and brought the interaction of both policies to the front. It is widely
accepted that monetary policy can affect financial stability through a number of channels,
including by affecting the tightness of borrowing constraints and probabilities of default (PDs), and
by affecting aggregate assets prices, which may exacerbate externalities and favor excessive
leverage, fire sales and volatile capital flows. Macro-prudential policy also can affect the conduct
of monetary policy via a number of channels. They include the use of loan-to-value and debt-toincome ratios for financial stability purposes, which can attenuate default frequency following a
tightening of monetary policy and facilitate the control of aggregate demand. To the extent that
these ratios can dampen household debt growth, they also will help monetary policy objectives.
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Capital requirements can reduce excessive leverage and risk-taking (e.g. De Paoli and Paustain,
2013, Financial stability Review, Banque de France, 2014, and Cerutti et al, 2015).1
The theoretical and empirical literature on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy has been
growing rapidly. There is a broad acceptance of the presence of the risk-taking channel—
henceforth micro risk-taking channel. This conclusion is robust to the use of loan-level and firmlevel data on individual countries (e.g., Jimenez et al, 2014, Bonfim and Soares, 2017, and,
Ioannidou et al, 2015); the use of data at the bank or country level (e.g. Altumbas et al, 2010, and
Bruno and Shin, 2015); and the use of lending surveys for the US and the euro area (Dell’Ariccia
et al, 2017, and Neuenkirch and Nöckel, 2018). Studies have covered different effects of risktaking behavior including on lending standards (Delis and Kouretas, 2011), leverage (de Groot,
2014), portfolio risk (Angeloni et al, 2015), ex-ante borrowers’ risk profiles and ex-post loans PDs
(Bonfim and Soares, 2017), banks’ capital structure (Dell’Ariccia et al, 2017), banks’ size (Buch
et al, 2014) and banks’ business lines (Altumbas et al, 2010).
However, the evidence on risk-taking behaviour in financial markets is not per se sufficient to
worry about significant negative effects on financial stability. There is a growing agreement that
financial stability and the policy to preserve it, macro-prudential policy, are concerned with
systemic risk (CGFS No 57, 2016). At the end of the day, none of the concerns expressed before
and after Lehman Brothers’ collapse regarding the role of low real interest rates on financial
stability would seem warranted if protracted low policy rates did not increase systemic risk.
However, the theoretical and empirical literature discussing whether and how a protracted period
of low interest rates affects systemic risk—henceforth the “systemic risk-taking channel of
monetary policy”—is scarce. Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2017), who develop a general
equilibrium model with a measure of systemic risk, is a conspicuous exception. In addition, the
reduced number of empirical papers on the systemic risk channel of monetary policy cover only
one or two of the three forms of systemic risk (e.g., Kapinos, 2017, Faia and Karau, 2018).
Against this background, this paper uses Segoviano’s (2006) Consistent Information Multivariate
Density Optimization (CIMDO) methodology to measure systemic risk across two of the three
forms it can take according to the ECB (2009) classification. It considers systemic risk as a
common shock that affects the whole banking system and as an idiosyncratic shock to a financial
institution that is propagated to the rest of the financial sector. To take into account the third form
that systemic risk can take, i.e. as a slow build-up of vulnerabilities in the banking system that
may unravel in a disorderly manner and affect the real economy, this paper follows Jin and Nadal
De Simone (2014a, 2017). Thus, it measures the slow build-up of systemic risk in the banking
sector by combining the CIMDO-derived measures of systemic risk with the Generalized Dynamic
Factor model of Forni et al (2000) and a dynamic t-copula. Therefore, this study contributes to the
1

Cesa-Bianchi and Rebucci (2016) point to the absence of an effective policy additional to interest rates aimed at
preserving financial stability in the run-up to the GFC.
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literature on the systemic risk-taking channel of monetary policy by using systemic risk measures
that, in contrast to what is available so far, are comprehensive and consider the time-varying nonlinearities and feedback effects typical of financial markets.
This research asks three interrelated questions. Have persistently low interest rates resulted in
systemic risk-taking behavior in the euro area banking sector? If the answer to this question is
affirmative, through what form has systemic-risk taking manifested itself? Finally, does the form
in which systemic risk-taking manifest itself differ across conventional monetary policy (CMP) and
unconventional monetary policy (UMP)?
The answers to these questions are the following. First, systemic risk-taking is present in the euro
area. Second, systemic risk-taking happens mostly via contagion and interconnectedness. Third,
its significance depends on the type of monetary policy. Short-term and conditional forward
measures of systemic risk in the euro area banking sector do not increase following a CMP or an
UMP loosening. However, a CMP or UMP loosening seems to increase the common component
of the contagion measure of systemic risk. This effect is quantitatively slightly more important for
CMP shocks than for UMP shocks. When monetary policy loosening takes place via a fall in the
spread, interpreted in this paper as a “signaling shock” à la Peersman (2011)—a form of UMP—
both the measures of systemic risk reflecting contagion and interconnectedness and their
common components increase.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next section provides a brief review of the
literature on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy at the bank and industry level as well as
at the systemic level. It also introduces the systemic risk measures used in this study, which are
discussed in more detail in Appendix I. Section 3 discusses the data and their transformation.
Section 4 discusses the econometric methodology. Section 5 addresses estimation and
identification. Section 6 presents the results and robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature review
i.

The (micro) risk-taking channel of monetary policy

Since Borio and Zhu (2008) coined the phrase “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy—the
impact of policy rate changes on risk perception or risk tolerance and hence on the risk in
portfolios, on the pricing of risk and on the terms by which funding is extended—the theoretical
and empirical literature on the subject has grown significantly. The authors identified three
mechanisms by which the risk-taking channel may operate. First, changes in interest rates affect
valuations, income and cash flows. Second, low interest rates in the presence of nominal rates of
return targets (e.g. in insurance contracts) may induce risk taking. Finally, central banks’
communication strategies and the frameworks within which they conduct policy (e.g. their
commitment and accountability) influence agents’ behavior and may affect risk taking. Research
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along the line of the three mechanisms mentioned in the seminal paper by Borio and Zhu has
expanded, and other mechanisms have been added to the list.
For Adrian et al (2013) low interest rates increase the value of financial assets and collateral
lowering financial institutions’ risk perception and increasing leverage. This mechanism works
more rapidly when balance sheets are marked to market as value changes are more rapidly
reflected in balance sheets, establishing thereby a link between leverage, credit risk and liquidity
(Adrian and Shin, 2010). Rajan’s “search for yield” (2006) is an early elaboration of the second
mechanism by which lower interest rates reduce financial institution’s’ profitability, which faced
with nominal rates-of-return commitments to stakeholders, are thus induced to invest in higherrisk assets. Alessandri and Nelson (2015) suggest that UMP, by flattening the term-structure of
interest rates, induces banks to search for yield raising thereby the overall risk of their portfolios.
De Nicolò et al (2010) suggest that besides risk-taking there is also risk-shifting behavior by
financial intermediaries, at least in the short run, which runs opposite to risk taking (or portfolio
choice). Which of the two effects will prevail in the end will depend on the health of the financial
institution whereby well-capitalized banks increase risk taking and poorly capitalized banks
reduce risk taking. Dell’Ariccia et al (2011) argue that the net effect of prolonged periods of low
interest rates on risk taking depends on the degree of interest-rate pass-through, risk shifting and
the capital structure of financial institutions. If banks can adjust their capital structures, faced with
a low interest rate environment, they will increase leverage and risk. If they cannot change their
capital structures, well-capitalized banks will increase risk taking and poorly-capitalized banks will
tend to do the opposite. However, the net effect will also depend on the contestability of the
banking industry and thus will vary across time and jurisdictions. Therefore, the net effect of
interest rates (and UMP) on bank risk-taking and its interaction with bank’s leverage clearly is an
empirical question.
The importance of banks’ capital structure on the net effect of risk-taking behavior stresses the
role of heterogeneity. Heterogeneity in banks’ risk-taking behavior is consistent with principalagent theories (e.g. Freixas and Rochet, 2008, Agur and Demertzis, 2012). In a world of
asymmetric information and limited liability, banks with a higher leverage-to-capital ratio will take
more risk when faced with low interest rates. In the non-bank financial sector, Morris and Shin
(2014) show how risk-neutral asset managers’ aversion to underperform make portfolio choices
that lead to large jumps in risk premia when faced with small future anticipated changes in central
bank policy rates.
Empirical evidence on the existence and economic significance of the risk-taking channel of
monetary policy has also grown rapidly. Research has been concerned with the different
mechanisms of the risk-taking channel. Low interest rates have been found to induce banks to
reduce lending standards in the US (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2010, Angeloni and Faia, 2013,
Abbate and Thaler, 2015, Scheffknecht, 2016), and also in the euro area (Altumbas et al, 2011,
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Delis and Kouretas, 2011, and Maddaloni and Peydró, 2013). Loan spreads for riskier firms tend
to become lower during periods of low interest rates according to Paligorova and Santos’ (2017)
study using the US Senior Loan Officers Survey. In addition, faced with low interest rates, banks
are found to increase leverage in the US (de Groot, 2014, and Adrian and Shin, 2014) and in the
euro area (Angeloni et al, 2015), as well as to intensify the risk of their portfolios (Angeloni et al,
2015, for the US, Bonfim and Soarez, 2017, for Portugal, Karapetyan for Norway, 2016). In a
large sample of 47 countries, Claessens et al (2017) find evidence that low interest rates are
associated with a decrease in banks’ margins and profitability.
Dell’Ariccia et al (2017) use the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending and find
that the risk rating of new loans in negatively associated with increases in interest rates, a
relationship more significant for more capitalized banks, notably during tranquil periods. These
results are consistent with the prevalence of risk-shifting behavior. They contrast from Jimenez et
al’s (2014) results that low interest rates prior to loan origination lead Spanish banks to lend more
to borrowers with a worse credit history and to extend loans with a higher PD. Low interest rates
during the life of the loan reduce the overall risk of the bank’s portfolio, but persistently low interest
rates can increase the PD in the medium term. Bonfim and Soares (2017) find similar results
using the Portuguese Credit Register. In contrast to Dell’Ariccia et al (2017), the last two papers
find that less capitalized (often smaller) banks grant more loans to riskier firms, which is consistent
with the search-for-yield mechanism. For Bolivia, Ioannidou et al (2015) find evidence that low
interest rates result in the granting of riskier loans to borrowers with worse credit standing, lower
ex-ante internal ratings and weaker ex-post performance (especially when interest rates increase
later in the cycle). Effects are stronger for poorly capitalized banks. Like Ioanidou et al (2015),
Gambacorta (2009) pointed to the time-dimension of risk-taking behavior with evidence that while
in the short term lower interest rates reduce PDs of outstanding variable rate loans, in the medium
term, by increasing the value of collateral, lower interest rates lead banks to lower lending
standards. Like Dell’Ariccia et al (2017), Buch et al (2014) use the Federal Reserve’s Survey of
Terms of Business Lending, but they find no evidence of risk taking for the overall banking system.
Only small domestic banks increase their risk exposure following a loosening of monetary policy.
The literature has also covered the relation between risk taking and institutional and technological
factors. Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) find that the effects of low policy rates on risk taking are
amplified by weak supervision standards and securitization in the US; Delis and Kouretas (2011)
find similar results for the euro area. For Dubecq et al (2009) regulatory arbitrage introduces
uncertainty about the risk exposure of intermediaries. This induces households to infer that higher
asset prices are due to a decline in risk, an underestimation that moves negatively with interest
rates levels.
The international dimension of risk taking has been also studied by Morais et al (2017) who find
evidence of an international risk-taking channel: the US, UK and euro area monetary policies
impact credit supply to Mexican firms through affiliates of US, UK and euro area banks in Mexico,
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respectively. Foreign monetary policy increases disproportionally more the supply of credit to
borrowers with higher ex-ante loan rates and with substantially higher ex-post PDs. For Bruno
and Shin (2013), risk-taking at the international level thrives on the feedback loop between global
banks’ increased leverage, capital flows and exchange rate appreciation of receiving economies.
ii.

The systemic risk-taking channel of monetary policy

While the literature on systemic risk is vast, to the best of our knowledge, few theoretical papers
exist. Martinez-Miera and Repullo’s (2017) address the issue of systemic risk-taking and the level
of real interest rates. Theirs is a real model with nominal frictions in which banks choose the level
of firms’ monitoring intensity and is therefore unrelated to monetary policy. However, the model
allows understanding key regularities of financial markets, which are at the heart of systemic risk:
the financial system is procyclical, risk premia countercyclical, and booms and busts emerge
because of persistently low interest rates. Laséen et al (2017) use a measure of leverage-driven,
time-varying systemic risk in a New-Keynesian calibrated model and find that a surprise monetary
policy tightening does not necessarily reduce systemic risk, especially in bad states of the world.
The empirical literature on systemic risk-taking and monetary policy, while growing, is of limited
size. With a few exceptions, studies measure the effects of UMP loosening on aggregate risktaking in the banking sector, but not systemic risk-taking behaviour properly speaking. Lambert
and Ueda (2014) find that UMP has ambiguous effects on US, euro area and UK banks’
profitability. While it reduces some aspects of banks’ risk, such as leverage and short-term debt
ratios, it increases risk taking measured as a rise in the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total
assets. Fratzscher and Reith (2015) find evidence that different types of unconventional policy
loosening have different effects on euro area banks’ credit risk measured using banks’ credit
default swaps (CDS) spreads. Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and the 3-year Longer-term
Refinacing Operations (LTROs) effectively reduced credit risk among banks, in contrast to the
implementation of the Securities Market Program (SMP), which tended instead to increase banks’
credit risk.
Deeg and Hodula (2016) find that UMP in the euro area escalates financial instability. They
measure systemic risk with the SRISK indicator, Brownlees and Engle’s (2012) extension of
Acharya et al (2012) Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES). Verhelst (2017) finds that on the day of
the announcement, the Covered Bond Purchase Program (CBPP) and SMP had a positive impact
on MES, while OMT reduced MES. The Fixed Rate Full Allotment (FRFA) and LTROs had
ambiguous effects on MES.
Colletaz et al (2018) argue that the empirical literature on risk-taking behaviour has not focused
on the time dimension of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy and the causal link between
them. They use the long-term causal measures of Dufour and Taamouti (2010) and find a
significant long-term effect of monetary policy in the euro area. They suggest that the risk-taking
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channel played an important role in the events that led to the GFC. Kapinos (2017) studies the
effects of monetary policy surprises and news on a battery of systemic risk measures in the US
banking sector.2 The study finds that monetary policy surprises do not affect: 1) measures of
specific institutions’ contribution to systemic risk, i.e. conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR), changes
in it (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016), MES, and SRISK; 2) measures of comovement and
contagion, such as the Absorption Ratio (Kritzman et al, 2011), the Dynamic Causality Index (Billio
et al, 2012), and the International Spillover Index (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009); and 3) measures
of volatility and instability, i.e. equity Volatility, Turbulence (Kritzman and Li, 2010), CatFin (Allen
et al, 2012) and Giglio et al (2016) measures of book and market leverage. This is the case for
both the overall sample and during the zero-lower-bound (ZLB) period. In contrast, with the
exception of the Dynamic Causality Index and the International Spillover Index, monetary policy
news shocks generate small reductions in systemic risk due to anticipated contractionary future
monetary policy over the full sample, and large reductions due to anticipated expansionary policy
at the ZLB.
The closest research paper to the current study is Faia and Karau (2018) who use SRISK, the
long-run MES, CoVaR and changes in it to assess for a sample of 11 countries the systemic risk
effects of monetary policy on banks. They find robust evidence of a systemic risk-taking channel
across different methodological approaches and using as monetary policy instrument a policy rate
and shadow rates (Krippner, 2013, and Wu and Xia, 2017) as well as the size of central banks’
balance sheets. Regarding the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, they find that while
banks' balance sheet variables largely move in line with the risk-taking channel, they do not
account for the full transmission into systemic risk, pointing towards the importance of
interconnectedness and contagion in systemic risk formation. Importantly, they find evidence of
an international risk-taking channel by which monetary policy in the US matters for their measure
of long-run MES.
iii.

The systemic risk-taking measures used in this study

This section does not review the large set of systemic risk measures used in the literature. For a
good survey, see Silva et al (2017). Appendix I describes the systemic risk measures used in this
paper in detail as they are applied to a sample of the 30 largest euro area banking groups. This
section briefly contrasts the systemic risk measures used to capture the systemic risk-taking
channel of monetary policy in this paper with those used in the literature reviewed in section 2.ii.
The main message is that none of the measures used in the literature so far model banks’ default
dependence explicitly and captures the time-varying non-linearities and feedback effects typical
of financial markets in an internally consistent manner.

2

Kapinos also has measures of liquidity and credit not considered in this study as they do not strictly refer to systemic
risk.
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To start with the simplest set of measures, measures of volatility have almost no explanatory
power for specific events, as described in Acharya et al (2010). Variations of Value at Risk, while
used to measure risk of an individual institution in isolation (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016), are
not suited to measure systemic risk, which needs to capture the risk of the whole system with
feedback effects and non-linearities. While CoVaR and changes in CoVaR (ΔCoVaR) can capture
the risk of the banking industry, they have the drawback of only measuring the system’s loss
conditional on individual institutions. Therefore, they can only identify systemically important
institutions and cannot appropriately aggregate the systemic risk contributions of individual
institutions. In addition, CoVaR uses correlation to measure spillover, with only the latter implying
causation. In addition, like the VaR measure, CoVaR is likely to behave very differently in a crisis
and in a normal period over which the correlations are measured. Another disadvantage is that
CoVaR treats banks that have the same correlation with the market, but different volatilities, in
the same manner (Acharya, Engle and Richardson, 2012).
Two other used measures of systemic risk are the distress insurance premium (DIP) (Huang et
al, 2009) and SRISK (Acharya et al, 2012). While these indicators take the size of a financial
institution explicitly into account in contrast to MES (Huang et al, 2009) or CoVaR (Adrian and
Brunnermeier, 2016), SRISK computes only the expected capital shortfall of a bank. An important
drawback of MES and DIP is that they are calculated using equity returns and CDS data,
respectively. As the experience of the run-up to the crisis shows, however, booming stock markets
coincided with low volatility and low risk premia indicating markets’ poor performance in pricing
risk over time. As suggested by research on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, systemic
risk measures based on market capitalization and CDS are best viewed as indicators of risk
perception than as indicators of risk. In addition, MES is not a good indicator for predicting risk
before a crisis (Idier et al, 2014). Finally, as suggested by Faia and Karau (2018), while banks’
balance sheets largely move in line with risk taking, they do not account for the full transmission
of micro risk-taking into systemic risk-taking: it is necessary to recognize and measure
interconnectedness and contagion in systemic risk formation.
3. Econometric methodology
The methodology used in this paper is Forni et al (2009) structural factor-augmented vector
autoregressive model (SFAVAR) for large cross-section panels.
i.

The factor model

Each variable 𝑥𝑛𝑡 is a finite realization of a real-valued stochastic stationary process with mean
zero and finite second-order moments which can be represented by the sum of the two latent
orthogonal components, the common component 𝜒𝑛𝑡 and the idiosyncratic component 𝜉𝑛𝑡 . The
common component is driven by q common shocks 𝑢𝑡 :
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𝑥𝑛𝑡 = 𝜒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜉𝑛𝑡 = 𝐵𝑛 (𝐿) 𝑢𝑡 + 𝜉𝑛𝑡 ,

(1)

and
𝐵𝑛 (𝐿) = 𝐴𝑛 𝑁(𝐿),

(2)

with 𝐴𝑛 an n x r matrix and N(L) an r x q absolutely summable matrix function of L. With the rx1
vector 𝑓𝑡 defined as 𝑓𝑡 = 𝑁(𝐿)𝑢𝑡 , equation (1) can be written in a static form:
𝑥𝑛𝑡 = 𝐴𝑛 𝑓𝑡 + 𝜉𝑛𝑡 .

(3)

The r entries of 𝑓𝑡 shall be a relatively small number of static factors while the q common shocks
𝑢𝑡 shall be the dynamic factors. The dynamic factors q are the structural sources of variation of
the structural factor model of Forni et al (2009), and q < r. Clearly, identification and estimation of
the common components 𝜒𝑛𝑡 requires that common and idiosyncratic components be orthogonal,
pervasiness of the dynamic and static factors and non-pervasiness of the idiosyncratic
components.3 Forni et al (2009) prove that a large n together with the heterogeneity of the
dynamic responses of 𝜒𝑛𝑡 to 𝑢𝑡 implies that q < r and that most likely N(L) is invertible, which in
turn implies fundamentalness.
The model can be written as a moving average of finite order by writing equation (2) as a
combination of a finite moving average n x q matrix 𝐶𝑛 (𝐿) and a q x q diagonal matrix 𝜓𝑛 (L):
𝑥𝑛𝑡 = 𝐶𝑛 (𝐿) 𝜓𝑛 (𝐿) 𝑢𝑡 + 𝜉𝑛𝑡 .

(4)

The dynamic factors 𝑢𝑡 are the structural shocks and 𝐶𝑛 (𝐿) 𝜓𝑛 (𝐿) are impulse responses. Given
that the impulse-response functions and the structural primitive shocks are not identified, (4) has
not a unique representation.
ii.

Identification

With the common component written as in (1), 𝐵𝑛 (𝐿) 𝑢𝑡 , if:
𝜒𝑛𝑡 = 𝐶𝑛 (𝐿) 𝑣𝑡 ,

3

(5)

In Forni et al (2009), pervasiness is to be understood in the sense that each common shock affects all items of the
cross-section dataset as n increases. The heterogeneity of the panel is directly related to the number of static factors
r, which allows that different variables load the structural shocks with different delays making it possible the presence
of lagged, coincident and leading variables.
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for any 𝑛 ∈ ℕ and with 𝑣𝑡 a q-dimensional fundamental orthonormal white noise vector, then:
𝐶𝑛 (𝐿) = 𝐵𝑛 (𝐿) 𝐻,
𝑣𝑡 = 𝐻 ′ 𝑢𝑡 ,

(6)

where H is a q x q unitary matrix, i.e. 𝐻 𝐻 ′ = 𝐼𝑞 . Therefore, identification requires choosing a
matrix H such that economically motivated restrictions on the matrix 𝐵𝑛 (𝐿) 𝐻 are respected. Forni
et al (2009) suggest using the maximization or the minimization of an objective function involving
𝐵𝑛 (𝐿) 𝐻 or, alternatively, imposing zero restrictions on the impact effects 𝐵𝑛 (0) 𝐻 or the long-run
effects 𝐵𝑛 (1)𝐻0, or both. Instead, in this paper, following Forni and Gambetti (2010b)4, rather than
identifying uniquely the shocks and impulse-response functions, a distribution of shocks and their
related impulse-response functions is identified via imposing a set of inequality restrictions on the
impulse-response functions themselves. A set of zero and inequality restrictions is used given
that several H matrices can generate impulse-response functions that satisfy the same sign
restrictions (Rubio-Ramirez et al, 2010). The zero restrictions are implemented using the
methodology of Reppa (2009), which rules out rotation matrices that do not satisfy the zero
restrictions before checking out the inequality restrictions discussed in Section 5.ii below.5
iii.

Estimation

Forni et al (2009) provide a detailed formal discussion of the population formulae for estimating
the common factors and the impulse-response functions as well as a proof of the consistency of
the latter. Importantly for this study, they prove that a large cross-section dimension relative to
the sample size, i.e. T/n → 0, has a rate of consistency √𝑇, which is the same that would result if
the common components were observed.
As it can be seen by inspecting equation (3), the static factors 𝑓𝑡 are identified only up to a premultiplication by a non-singular r x r matrix. What can be done is to estimate an r-dimensional
vector with entries spanning the same linear space as the entries of 𝑓𝑡 using the first r principal
𝑥 is the
components of the panel 𝑥𝑛𝑡 and the factor loadings of the associated eigenvectors. The Γ̂
sample variance-covariance matrix of the information matrix. The loading matrix 𝐴̂ =
( 𝑎̂1′ 𝑎̂2′ … 𝑎̂𝑛′ )′ is the n x r matrix with the normalized eigenvectors that correspond to the first
𝑥 . The estimated factors are: 𝑓
̂′𝑛 ( 𝑥̂1′ 𝑥̂2′ … 𝑥̂𝑛′ )′.
̂𝑡 = 𝐴
largest 𝑟̂ eigenvalues of Γ̂
̂ is run with
To estimate the underlying dynamic factors, after setting a number of lags 𝑝̂ , a VAR(𝑝)
̂ (𝐿) and the residuals ε̂𝑡 . After having obtained an estimate
𝑓̂𝑡 to estimate the lagged coefficients 𝐷
𝜀 , can be decomposed to generate an
of 𝑞̂, the sample variance-covariance matrix of ε̂𝑡 , Γ̂
estimate of a non-structural representation of the common components. In equation (5), the
estimated matrix of impulse-response functions is:
4
5

See Uhlig (2005) for the original suggestion.
See Pellényi (2012) for an empirical application.
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̂𝑛 (𝐿)−1 𝑆̂,
𝐶̂𝑛 (𝐿) = 𝐴̂𝑛 𝐷

(7)

𝜀 ordered in decreasing order, 𝛺
̂ the
̂ 𝛺̂. Let 𝜇̂ 𝑗𝜀 , j=1,… 𝑞̂, be the j-th eigenvalue of Γ̂
where 𝑆̂ = 𝐾

̂ the r x q matrix whose columns are the
q x q diagonal matrix with √ 𝜇̂ 𝑗𝜀 as its (j, j) entry, and 𝐾
corresponding normalized eigenvectors.
Forni and Gambetti (2010b) account for estimation uncertainty using a non-overlapping block
bootstrap technique. This is not done in this paper as the available sample is not long enough to
allow for meaningful block-size. However, as mentioned above, this is not a major concern with a
large panel such as the one used in this paper (for a proof of this statement, see Forni et al, 2009,
and Bai and Ng, 2006).
The last step of the estimation procedure is the imposition of the identification zero and inequality
restrictions. N draws of a vector of angles θ with dimension 𝑤 = (𝑞 2 − 𝑞)/2 are made from a
uniform distribution in the range 0 ≤ 𝜃𝑗 < 𝜋, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑤 − 1, 0 ≤ 𝜃𝑤 < 2𝜋 and only those
𝐵̂𝑛 (𝐿) = 𝐶̂𝑛 (𝐿) H(θ) that satisfy the restrictions are retained as structural impulse responses. The
point estimates and the related confidence bands are obtained retaining the mean and the
relevant percentiles of the distribution.
Note that due to the presence of generated regressors, estimated standard errors may not be
consistent. Also, the VAR parameters can be biased in small samples. The bootstrap-afterbootstrap procedure of Kilian (1998) is used to address these issues. The first bootstrap estimates
the bias of the VAR parameters, and the second bootstrap uses the bias-corrected VAR
parameters to generate the impulse-responses and their confidence bands. In the second
bootstrap, 50 rotation matrices are drawn for each iteration. If none satisfies the restrictions, the
algorithm moves onto the next bootstrap until 200 impulse responses are generated. The median
impulse responses and their 16th and 84th percentiles are reported. The median of variance
decompositions are obtained for the 200 draws.
4. Data and data transformation
This study uses a large macro-financial database of 519 time series including systemic risk
indicators of the 30 largest euro area banking groups. Data are from the ECB Data Warehouse,
Bloomberg, BIS, and Eurostat. The euro area Bank Lending Survey (BLS) is used to disentangle
demand and supply factors in lending following the literature (e.g., Neuenkirch and Nöckel, 2018,
Delis et al, 2017). Following Ciccarelli et al (2013), the Demand for Loans variable is constructed
using the BLS answers to questions 6 and 18, the Lending Conditions and Standards variable
uses answers to questions 10.1 and 10.2 and the Factors affecting Lending Conditions variable
uses answers to questions 2, 11, and 14. The sample covers the period 2002Q4-2017Q2. The
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beginning of the sample is motivated by the date the euro area BLS started. All data are
seasonally adjusted.
It is well known that available unit root tests have low power (Enders, 1995). After having tested
the time series using optimal lags determined by the BIC criterion, Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock
(1996) unit root test—with a null of non-stationarity—and Kwiatowsky, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin
(1992) unit root test—with a null of stationarity—were performed. However, they provided
conflicting results on the degree of integration of a large number of time series. Euro area real
GDP and the harmonized index of consumer prices are conspicuous cases. Not only determining
the true order of integration of a time series is problematic. In addition, a key and well-established
result is that the difference operator that is widely used to render I(1) time series stationary, is a
high-pass filter. This filter, which has properties similar to those of the derivative, has a gain
function ‘‘that deviates substantially from the squared gain function of an ideal high-pass filter’’
(Koopmans, 1974).6 The popularity of first-differencing I(1) series in applied econometrics is,
therefore, somewhat surprising. The wide application of the Hodrick-Prescott filtering is also
surprising. It is known that the Hodrick-Prescott filter produces series with spurious dynamic
relations that have no basis in the underlying data-generating process, has an end-point problem
and a statistical formalization typically produces values for the smoothing parameter λ vastly at
odds with common practice, e.g. a value for λ far below 1600 for quarterly data (Hamilton, 2018).
Unless properly tested, a blind application of this smoothing parameter to periods and series other
than the US time series used by Hodrick-Prescott is bound to distort the allocation of variance
between trend and cycles affecting the analysis. Therefore, in this paper, the dataset is
transformed using the Corbae-Ouliaris’ Ideal Band-pass Filter (Corbae and Ouliairs, 2006).7 This
filter has no finite sampling error, has superior end-point properties, lower mean-squared error
than popular time domain filters such as Christiano and Fitzgerald, and is consistent, in contrast
to Baxter and King. It is ideal in the sense that has no leakages across frequencies.
5. Estimation and identification
i.

Specification of the static factors r and the dynamic factors q

Several tests are used to determine the number of static and dynamic factors (or shocks). For the
whole sample and for the period 2008:4-2017Q2, the same number of factors were determined.
Alessi et al (2010) test suggests 8 static factors (6 factors for the period after Lehman).8 Onatski’s
(2010) procedure indicates 4 factors. In this paper, following the suggestion of Stock and Watson
(2005) of selecting as many factors as necessary to explain a sufficient variance share of the key
6

See Igan et al (2011) for a detailed discussion and examples.
We are grateful to Sam Ouliaris for making available the Ideal Band-pass Filter code for I(2) series.
8 Alessi et al (2009) test delivers more reliable estimates than Bai and Ng (2002), especially when there are large
idiosyncratic disturbances.
7
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variables, eight static factors are finally chosen. There is a reasonable statistical argument behind
this choice. The number of static factors governs the degree of heterogeneity of the impulseresponse functions. With a larger number of factors, it is possible for different variables to load a
shock with different delays enriching the dynamics. Table 1 shows the percentage of variance
explained by 4 and 8 static factors in the whole sample.
Table 1 - Explained Variance by Static Factors
Variables

4 Factors

8 Factors

GDP

42.95

63.99

Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices

54.19

78.20

Private Consumption

70.34

79.95

Private Investment

50.24

74.38

Unemployment Rate

63.07

81.30

Exports

25.73

53.07

Current Account

69.33

78.42

Eonia Rate

20.04

62.96

Long-term Interest Rate

66.66

80.00

Balance Sheet of the ECB

80.55

88.77

BLS Demand Conditions

62.68

76.98

BLS Suply Conditions

60.54

73.21

BLS Supply Factors

65.51

74.84

Real Government Balance

40.05

66.17

Foreign Demand

55.13

82.79

Foreign Short-term Interest Rate

16.59

50.32

With r = 8, the AIC and BIC criteria to determine the number of lags in the Dynamic Factor Model
suggest 1 lag. The number of dynamic factors or primitive shocks is determined using several
procedures. According to Bai and Ng (2007) procedure, q is 2 or 3. Hallin and Liska (2007) 𝐼𝐶1
and 𝐼𝐶2 criteria suggest 4 q factors. Onatsky’s (2009) procedure suggests 3 dynamic factors.
Therefore, 3 factors or shocks are chosen for the whole sample and for the sample after Lehman:
a monetary policy shock, a supply shock and a fiscal shock. Results with an unspecified fourth
shock were not different and thus the discussion is based on the 3 chosen shocks.
ii.

Identifying Restrictions

After Lehman Brothers’ collapse, the ECB implemented a number of UMP measures, sometimes
simultaneously with CMP measures. This poses a challenge for the identification of monetary
policy during a sample period spanning pre- and post-Lehman. Recent empirical literature has
used the balance sheet of central banks as a proxy for deliberate monetary policy decisions during
the UMP period (e.g. Peersman, 2011, Boeckx et al, 2014, Faia and Karau, 2018). Following the
implementation of the FRFA after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the ECB made recourse to
several other unconventional monetary policy measures.9 They include changes to assets’
eligibility and haircuts within its collateral framework, extension of the maximum maturity of

9

The FRFA policy made liquidity from the banking sector completely demand-driven.
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LTROs, extension of foreign-currency funding in cooperation with other central banks, outright
asset purchases, such as the CBPP, interventions in the government bond secondary market with
the SMP, introduction of the asset-back securities purchase program (ABSPP), the corporate
sector purchase program (CSPP) and the the expanded asset purchase program (APP), which
added the asset purchase program for public sector securities (PSPP). All these measures had
an effect on the ECB balance sheet, albeit in some cases effects on the monetary base were
sterilized.
The three dynamic factors or primitive shocks are identified using zero and inequality restrictions
based on economic theory and consistent with predictions of major empirical structural and semistructural models as well as applied DSGE models (Table 2). Therefore, as explained above,
shocks and impulse-response functions are not uniquely identified, but rather a distribution of
shocks and their related impulse-response functions is identified via imposing a set of inequality
restrictions as in Forni and Gambetti (2010b).
Table 2 - Identifying Shock Restrictions
CMP1

UMP1

UMP1: "Signaling"

Shadow Rate

Supply

Fiscal

GDP

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

+

(+)

Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

-

(+)

Exports of Goods

?

?

?

?

+

?

Nominal Effective Exchange Rate

-

-

-

-

?

?

Eonia Rate

-

0

0

?

?

+

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

-

n.a.

n.a.
?

Variables

Shadow Rate
Balance Sheet of the ECB

0

+

?

?

?

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

?

-

VIX

-

-

-

-

?

?

Eonia-MRO Spread

?

-

-

?

?

?

12M-1M Interest Rate Spread

?

?

-

?

?

?

External Demand

0

0

0

0

?

?

Foreign Interest Rate

0

0

0

0

?

?

Real General Government Balance

1

CMP refers to conventional monetary policy and UMP refers to unconventional monetary policy. Zero restrictions apply to impact responses.

Inequality restrictions apply to the first three quarters and allow zero responses. Parentheses indicate that the restrictions apply only to the third quarter.

Variables have the cumulative impulse response restricted for the first three quarters (e.g. Forni
and Gambetti, 2010b, Pellényi, 2012). CMP and UMP are restricted as follows. A CMP loosening
is captured by a fall in the Eonia rate10 covering the whole sample period, while an UMP loosening
is implemented by increasing the ECB balance sheet during the post-Lehman period.11 A
robustness check below uses the “shadow interest rate” of Wu and Xia (2016) constructed to
10

Results are broadly similar when the MRO rate substitutes the Eonia rate.
Other research studies measure UMP via its impact on money market rates or credit supply (e.g. Darracq et al,
2013). However, these variables are also driven by non-policy shocks and CMP. For example, when in December 2011
the ECB decided to offer liquidity to banks with a maturity of three years, it simultaneously decided to lower the MRO
rate 25bp making it difficult to disentangle CMP from UMP without further information. The same argument applies to
Fratzscher and Rieth (2016) use of the term spread, i.e., the difference between the yield on government bonds with
maturity of ten years and the three-month interest rate on treasury bills. Colletaz et al, 2016, use a short-term interest
rate gap measured as the difference between the short-term interest rate and its trend using the smoothing parameter
suggested by Hodrick-Prescott for the US. See the discussion of the shortcomings of this filtering approach above.
11
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encapsulate both CMP and UMP, and it is run over the whole sample period.12 As suggested by
Boeckx et al (2014), the innovation to the Eonia rate in the case of the CMP shock is orthogonal
to the ECB balance sheet, and it has a zero contemporaneous impact on it. Conversely, the UMP
positive innovation to the ECB balance sheet is orthogonal to shifts in the Eonia rate, and thus it
has a zero contemporaneous impact on the Eonia rate. A “signaling shock” (à la Peersman, 2011),
a form of UMP, is implemented in the period 2008:Q4-2017Q2 by a negative shock to the 12M1M Euribor rates spread.
A monetary policy shock increases real GDP and the harmonized index of consumer prices
(HICP), depreciates the real effective exchange rate, and reduces the VIX and the Eonia-MRO
spread (the latter only in the case of an UMP shock). The real general government balance
improves. The VIX is restricted not to rise after a monetary policy loosening during the first quarter.
Given that this indicator summarizes financial stress in euro area financial markets, conditioning
on it is important to disentangle endogenous responses of the ECB to financial markets stress,
for example via its standing facilities (Gambacorta et al, 2014).13 Finally, an expansionary UMP
shock does not increase the Eonia-MRO spread in the first quarter. This restriction is motivated
by the FRFA policy that accompanied other forms of UMP. It is intended to exclude exogenous
shocks to the demand for banks’ reserves without an ECB explicit policy action that may have
resulted in a fall in the VIX and an increase in the ECB balance sheet. An expansionary UMP is
expected to increase liquidity putting downward pressure on the Eonia-MRO spread. To help
disentangling a euro area monetary policy loosening from foreign monetary policy disturbances,
a zero restriction on the 3-month interest rate in the US is imposed on the same quarter of the
shock. Similarly, to help disentangling the euro area monetary policy loosening shock from a
foreign positive demand shock, a zero restriction is imposed on foreign demand as proxied by the
US GDP on the same quarter of the shock.14
The restriction that a monetary policy shock increases GDP and the HICP is applied on the third
quarter to allow for the lack of consensus on the very short-term effects of monetary policy on
these variables. Following Forni and Gambetti (2010b), the restriction that monetary policy
improves the general government balance is imposed on the third quarter. This approach is
motivated by the objective of further distinguishing monetary policy shocks from fiscal policy
shocks.

Lemke and Vladu’s (2017) shadow rate is not used in this paper as they do not allow agents to be forward-looking in
terms of the changing lower bound of interest rates and overlook the non-constant spread between the policy rate and
the government bond yield curve. Both components are crucial to fit the yield curve as well as to generate sensible
economic implications.
13 Boeckx et al, 2014, use the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) of Holló et al, 2012, instead of the VIX.
14 China overtook the US in terms of PPP-based share of world GDP in 2014, but the US has been a larger export
market for the EU than China. Using an index of US and China GDP as a proxy of foreign demand could serve as a
robustness check. However, given that monetary policy and cycles between the US and the euro area comove more
closely than monetary policy and cycles between China and the US, only US GDP was used to proxy foreign demand.
12
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The supply shock increases GDP and exports of goods while it reduces the HICP. The restrictions
are applied during the first three quarters. The expansionary fiscal shock deteriorates the real
general government balance, increases GDP and the HICP in the third quarter.15 To distinguish
it from a monetary policy shock, as in Forni and Gambetti (2014b), the fiscal policy shock is
restricted not to reduce the Eonia rate for at least one of the first three quarters. This shock is also
distinguished from a positive demand shock as the latter would be expected, ceteris paribus, not
to reduce the general government balance.
6. Results
This section presents the results of CMP shocks during the period 2002Q4-2017Q2, and of UMP
and “signaling shocks” during 2008Q4-2017Q2. For completeness, the supply and fiscal policy
shocks are briefly discussed in Appendix III. The benchmark SFAVAR model results are
presented in Figures 1 to 6. Figures depict the median impulse-responses and their 16th and 84th
percentile confidence intervals on selected variables following a shock of one standard deviation.
Impulse responses refer to the level of the variables except in the case of price and wage series
as they refer to annualized quarterly growth rates. The GDP cyclical component is in percent.
i.

CMP shocks, full sample period (2002:Q4-2017Q2)

The CMP shock is followed by an increase in GDP, the EA GDP cyclical component16 and the
HICP as well as a depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate (Figure 1). Exports volume
increases more than imports volume and the current account balance becomes positive after
eight quarters. The Eonia-MRO spread falls. The rise in the 12M-1M interest rate spread is driven
by the increase in the long-term rate likely reflecting rising inflation expectations. Net capital
outflows decrease between quarters three and seven and net capital inflows display a larger and
more protracted fall. The monetary policy shock, while restricted to be a CMP by imposing a zero
restriction on the ECB balance sheet in the first quarter, covers also the period after Lehman
Brothers’ collapse. Therefore, the ECB balance sheet starts rising after quarter two. This is a
feature of how monetary policy was conducted in the aftermath of the crisis, as the ECB balance
sheet rose by about 500bn euro in the last quarter of 2008 and notably when the central bank
formally started its quantitative easing program in January 2015.17 As a result, restricting the ECB
balance sheet further seems a poorer approach to performing an UMP shock with a zero
restriction on the monetary policy rate, which is addressed in the next subsection.

15

This approach takes into account the lagged effects of fiscal policy decisions and the uncertainty about the size and
direction of fiscal policy actions on output and prices as well as agents’ behavior regarding the present value of future
taxes.
16 The GDP cyclical component covers the standard NBER cycles between 2 to 4 years (minor cycle) and from 4 to 8
years (major cycle).
17 The average quarterly rate of change of the ECB balance sheet doubled to 3.6% in the period 2007Q4-2017Q2
relative to the period 1999Q2-2007Q3.
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Following the monetary policy shock, loan demand increases and lending conditions and factors
ease. Volatility falls as necessary to exclude the possibility of an endogenous response of
monetary policy to financial markets instability.18 The stock market rises during the first year
driven by better industrial stock performance and somewhat offset by the deteriorating
performance of the banking sector shares.
The monetary policy shock is well identified. It is clearly not an expansionary fiscal policy shock
as the general government balance remains largely unaffected, nor it is a demand shock as the
financial conditions and the behavior of the current account, the exchange rate and the EoniaMRO spread are inconsistent with a positive demand shock. While the shock cannot be confused
with a supply shock either, the persistence of the unit labor cost fall is somewhat difficult to
rationalize. Partly at least, it may reflect the actual behavior of euro area unit labor cost growth,
which after rising to a peak of about 2% per annum in 2012Q3, declined to almost 0% in 2014Q1
and remained at around 0.6% per annum until the end of the sample period. However, a
robustness check using productivity per person and productivity per hour instead of unit labor
costs provides the same results.
Systemic risk in its first two forms declines both in the short term and in the medium term, although
it takes longer for contagion-related systemic risk measures. Associated PDs also fall.19 Leverage
falls (as do implied banks’ assets), which is consistent with Lambert and Ueda (2014) for US
banks. The fall in forward measures of risk is in contrast with Colletaz et al’s (2016) findings. This
paper’s results shed a different light on Faia and Karau (2018), who using SRISK, CoVaR and
changes in it, find evidence of systemic risk-taking largely driven by interconnectedness and
contagion and supported by international risk-taking as a result of US monetary policy. In this
study, PAO measures of contagion, both in the short term and in the medium term are sticky,
while other forms of systemic risk measures fall. Importantly, the slow buildup of vulnerabilities
proxied by the common component of the conditional forward PAO measure of contagion
(PAO_LT_CC) indicates the contribution of loose monetary policy conditions to systemic risktaking. It is noteworthy to stress that these results, in contrast to Faia and Karau’s, control for
spillovers from US monetary policy shocks.

18

Following the start of the sub-prime defaults during the first quarter of 2007 in the US, the year was characterized by
a generalized rise in volatility across markets and regions. Beyond the world-known end-of-reporting-period effects,
particularly at the end of June and December, market stress resulted in a large use of ECB standing facilities. Stabilizing
open market operations by the ECB made these effects less evident after 2007.
19 This result is consistent with Jiménez et al’s (2014) suggestion that lower interest rates reduce banks’ total credit risk
since the volume of outstanding loans is larger than the volume of new loans.
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Figure 1 – CMP Shocks and Systemic Risk-taking

Note 1: JPoD accounts for joint probability of default, SFM for banking system fragility measure, BSI for bank stability
index and PAO for probability that at least one bank will default given that one specific bank already defaulted. ST
accounts for short term or 1 year, LT for the conditional forward probability of the respective systemic risk measure,
and CC for the common component of the respective systemic risk measure.
Note 2: Impulse responses refer to the level of the variables except in the case of price and wage series as they refer
to annualized quarterly growth rates. The euro area (EA) GDP cyclical component is in percent.

As suggested by Dell’Ariccia et al (2017, and Jimenez et al (2014), low interest rates for a short
period of time may improve the overall quality of the banks’ loan portfolio, but holding these rates
low for a prolonged period of time can increase medium-term PDs. The systemic risk implications
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of this mechanism can explain the fall in the forward conditional common component of the
contagion measure PAO.
ii.

UMP shocks, period (2008:Q4-2017Q2)

This section discusses UMP shocks during the period 2008Q4-2017Q2 (Figure 2). Overall, results
are not qualitatively different from the CMP shocks effects on the economy and on systemic risktaking, although quantitatively seem more important. This qualifies Debortoli et al’s (2018)
argument of “perfect substitutability” between CMP and UMP in the US when applied to euro area
monetary policy.
The UMP shock is followed by an increase in GDP, the EA GDP cyclical component and the HICP
as well as a depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate. The rise in output and prices is
more important than in the case of the CMP shock. In contrast to the CMP shock, exports volume
increases less than imports volume and the current account moves into deficit during the first
year. The Eonia-MRO spread falls as the increase in the ECB balance sheet raises money
markets liquidity. The rise in the 12M-1M interest rate spread is driven by the increase in the longterm rate likely reflecting rising inflation expectations. Both effects are similar in magnitude
although display a shorter duration than in the case of a CMP shock. In contrast to the case
following a CMP shock, net capital outflows increase in the first two quarters and diminish in the
medium term. Net capital inflows are not affected.
Following the monetary policy shock, loan demand increases and lending conditions and factors
ease, although these changes are less pronounced than in the case of the CMP shock. Volatility
falls as necessary to exclude an endogenous response of monetary policy to financial markets
instability and is more rapid than in the case of CMP shocks.20 The stock market rises during the
first year driven by better shares performance in both in the banking sector and the industrial
sector. The improvement in bank stocks is an important difference with the effects of the CMP
shock.
The monetary policy shock is well identified. It is not an expansionary fiscal policy shock as the
general government balance improves, nor it is a demand shock as the financial conditions and
the behavior of the exchange rate and the Eonia-MRO spread are inconsistent with a demand
shock. As it was the case with CMP shocks, the UMP shock cannot be confused with a supply
shock, despite the persistence of the unit labor cost fall (see the reference to a robustness check
above).

20

For an empirical analysis showing the stabilizing impact on financial markets following the Asset Purchase Facility
and the Large-scale Asset Purchase programs of the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve, respectively, see
Meaning and Zhu (2011).
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The results on systemic risk measures are consistent with those stemming from CMP shocks.
Systemic risk in its first two forms declines both in the short term and in the medium term, although
it does not take as long for contagion-related systemic risk measures as it was the case following
CMP shocks. Associated PDs also fall. Leverage falls (as do implied banks’ assets), although it
is much less persistent than following a CMP shock. The slow buildup of vulnerabilities proxied
by the common component of the conditional forward PAO measure of contagion (PAO_LT_CC)
clearly indicates the contribution of loose UMP conditions to systemic risk-taking.
As noted in the literature review, using CDS, Fratscher and Reith (2015) find that while OMT and
LTROs reduce credit risk, SMP rises it. Verhelst (2017) finds the same results using the systemic
risk measure MES. CBPP rises MES, LTROs, and FRFA have an ambiguous effect. In this paper,
loose monetary policy implemented by increases in the ECB balance sheet does seem on
average to have contributed to systemic risk-taking via rising the common component of
contagion forward measures, a proxy for the third form of systemic risk.
This study finds no indication that risk-taking in a systemic form rises following a loosening of
monetary policy implemented either in a conventional or unconventional manner via a mechanism
including increased leverage and capital flows (in contrast to Bruno and Shin, 2015). As euro area
countries share the same currency and the VIX falls after the CMP and the UMP shocks, Bruno
and Shin channels may not be fully operational. In addition, the identification scheme controls for
spillovers from US monetary policy shocks, an important part of Bruno and Shin’s framework.
Given the importance of the matter, this clearly requires further research.
What do results so far suggest about the (micro) systemic risk-taking channel? Lending standards
do fall after a loosening of CMP (as in Delis and Kouretas, 2011, and Maddaloni and Peydró,
2013, for the euro area, and as in Altumbas, 2011, for the US). Banks’ leverage falls in contrast
to what de Groot (2014) find for the US and Angeloni et al (2015) find for the euro area. Notice,
however, that leverage in this paper is market leverage, and not book leverage. While implied
assets fall, also market leverage falls, specially following UMP shocks largely because they boost
banks’ stock prices. The fall in short-term and conditional forward probabilities of default are
consistent with Ioanidou et al’s (2015) concern that banks may experience a deterioration in their
risk profile when interest rates rise later in the cycle (see also Jimenez et al, 2014). These findings
suggest that the results of Buch et al (2014) and Dell’Ariccia et al (2017), who found no risk taking
at the banking sector level in the US, need to be contrasted with estimates of systemic risk which
take into account not only PDs, but also correlations across asset prices, dynamic non-linearities
and the feedback effects typical of financial markets.
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Figure 2 – UMP Shocks and Systemic Risk-taking

Note 1: JPoD accounts for joint probability of default, SFM for banking system fragility measure, BSI for bank stability
index and PAO for probability that at least one bank will default given that one specific bank already defaulted. ST
accounts for short term or 1 year, LT for the conditional forward probability of the respective systemic risk measure,
and CC for the common component of the respective systemic risk measure.
Note 2: Impulse responses refer to the level of the variables except in the case of price and wage series as they refer
to annualized quarterly growth rates. The euro area (EA) GDP cyclical component is in percent.

iii.

“Signaling shocks” (à la Peersman), UMP period – 2008:Q4-2017Q2

Within the methodological framework of this research, it is interesting to test the importance of
monetary policymakers’ actions trying to guide long-term rate expectations. For example, when
the ECB lends at longer maturities or suggests in its communication a loosening of the future
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stance of monetary policy, a decline in the money market term spread follows. This is what
Peersman (2011) referred to as a “signaling shock”. This type of UMP action signals to markets
that the central bank is prepared to engage in monetary policy operations to boost confidence,
increase liquidity and reduce risk premia. Perhaps the most conspicuous example has been the
ECB Governor statement in London on 26 July, 2012, when bond yields of weak euro-member
governments were soaring, and traders doubted that national or EU-level institutions could get to
act together in time to avert a major crisis. International investors and markets got calmer after
his now famous remark: “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve
the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.” Later, central banks’ statements about the future
path of the monetary policy stance have come to be known as “forward guidance”. The ECB
began formally using forward guidance in July 2013 when the ECB’s Governing Council said that
it “expected interest rates to remain low for an extended period of time”. The literature on forward
guidance, now considered by some observers to be part of UMP, has grown rapidly (e.g. Filardo
and Hofman, 2014, and Bundick et al, 2017).21
This section presents the results of a “signaling shock” which, following Peersman (see Table 2),
is implemented as a fall in the spread between 12M and 1M Euribor rates with the MRO rate
restricted to be zero during the quarter of the shock. No restriction is put on the ECB balance
sheet as some UMP measures were sterilized (e.g. SMP) and others not.
Following a decline in the money market spread, GDP and inflation rise, albeit by small
magnitudes (Figure 3). However, and somewhat difficult to rationalize, there is a short-lived
negative EA GDP cyclical component. Import volume increases more than export volume and the
current account displays a deficit, more marked than in the other two previous monetary policy
shocks. This is perhaps due to the relatively smaller and less lasting nominal effective exchange
rate depreciation following the shock. VIX volatility falls persistently in agreement with the central
bank’s intention of boosting markets confidence. The stock market rises for both banks and
industry.22 The increase in economic activity forces the Eonia rate up after about two quarters as
a result of the increase in activity and inflation. As it was the case with the previous two monetary
policy shocks, long-term rates rise consistently with the rise in inflation. The ECB balance sheet
size falls by a small magnitude. Net capital outflows increase more than net inflows during the
first five quarters, but the later are more persistent. An important difference between the effects
of this monetary policy shock and the previous two shocks is the significant effect in the stock

21

The first central bank to provide markets with information about the future path of the monetary policy stance was
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ). Already in the 1990s, besides publishing its model for forecasting inflation,
the RBNZ provided in each quarterly inflation report the projected paths of the interest rate and the exchange rate
consistent with hitting the inflation target sometime 18 months later (e.g. McDermott and Lewis, 2016).
22 This study does not discuss the rapidly growing literature on information shocks à la Jarocinski and Karadi (2018),
which distinguishes between “monetary surprises” and “news” about the economy (see also Andrade and Ferroni,
2016). It is noteworthy, however, that the stock market results are consistent with Jarocinski and Karadi’s findings for
the euro area as they find that almost half of the ECB policy announcements are accompanied by a positive comovement of stock prices and interest rates, compared to a third in the US.
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market, which, in a clear sign of boosted confidence and reduced volatility, displays a persistent
broad-based improvement.
Compared to the two previous monetary policy shocks, systemic risk measures behave differently
and show heightened systemic risk-taking.23 While the short term and conditional forward forms
of systemic risk measures tend to decline, this type of UMP loosening produces a rise in the
conditional forward System Fragility Measure (SFM_LT) and in the Bank Stability Index (BSI_LT)
during two quarters, and in the common component of the System Fragility Measure
(SFM_LT_CC) during three quarters. Importantly, this signaling shock rises the common
component of the conditional forward contagion measure (BSI_LT_CC) significantly and
persistently. Within the framework provided by the SFAVAR model, it can be speculated that as
markets become reassured of a persistent loosening in the monetary policy stance, banks
undertake more risk taking and increase thereby systemic risk. As argued by Alessandri and
Nelson (2015), this policy shock, by flattening the term-structure of interest rates, may add further
pressure to the search-for-yield behavior of banks because it increases the overall portfolio risk
and ceteris paribus, may otherwise reduce banks’ profitability.
This form of UMP contributes to the rise in the vulnerability in the euro area banking sector via
the contagion and interdependence forms of systemic risk as well as via increasing the banking
system vulnerability in the short run. This form of systemic risk-taking is difficult to capture using
standard risk-taking measures or systemic risk measures excluding non-linear and feedback
effects between banks’ balance sheets and asset prices.

23

In a calibrated New-Keynesian model Laséen et al (2017) find that risk-taking behavior is affected by systematic
monetary policy while the negative effects of a monetary policy surprise are mitigated when the financial sector is
strong and the surprise is small. Especially during bad times, a surprise monetary policy tightening does not reduce
systemic risk.
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Figure 3 – “Signaling” Shocks and Systemic Risk-taking

Note 1: JPoD accounts for joint probability of default, SFM for banking system fragility measure, BSI for bank stability
index and PAO for probability that at least one bank will default given that one specific bank already defaulted. ST
accounts for short term or 1 year, LT for the conditional forward probability of the respective systemic risk measure,
and CC for the common component of the respective systemic risk measure.
Note 2: Impulse responses refer to the level of the variables except in the case of price and wage series as they refer
to annualized quarterly growth rates. The euro area (EA) GDP cyclical component is in percent.

iv.

Contribution of monetary policy shocks to key variables behavior

To further facilitate the comparison between different monetary policy shocks, it is useful to
quantify each type of shock’s contribution to key variables behavior. Table 3 displays the share
of variance of selected variables explained by monetary policy shocks. For instance, CMP
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explains just over 1% of GDP variance while it raises to almost 5% in the case of UMP. The share
is very low when the monetary policy rate is replaced by the shadow rate. As it was obvious from
the impulse responses, “signaling shocks” in the period after Lehman affect the variance of output
more: it raises to 19%. Only in the case of CMP shocks the variance of GDP explained in Q1 is
smaller than the variance explained after three years.
UMP and “signaling shocks” have a strong short-term effect on the HICP explaining between
about 31% and 36% of its variance, respectively, while the share falls to 13% and almost 4% after
three years. Other monetary policy shocks explain less of the HICP variance. CMP has the largest
effect on the NEER variance, both in Q1 and after three years, almost 10% and 27%. “Signaling
shocks” explain a larger share of the Q1 variance of the Eonia rate (22%) and the ECB balance
sheet (almost 6%).
Table 3 - Monetary Shocks Contribution to Variances of Selected Variables
CMP
Variables

UMP

Shadow rate

Signaling

1Q

13Q

1Q

13Q

1Q

13Q

1Q

13Q

GDP

0.003

0.011

0.195

0.048

0.008

0.003

0.362

0.187

HICP

0.005

0.091

0.305

0.134

0.011

0.025

0.359

0.035

NEER

0.096

0.265

0.002

0.077

0.011

0.090

0.032

0.019

Eonia rate

0.025

0.014

0.006

0.052

0.048

0.005

0.222

0.295

ECB BS

0.000

0.084

0.012

0.018

0.031

0.012

0.057

0.068

-.-

-.-

-.-

-.-

0.122

0.093

-.-

-.-

Shadow Rate

7. Robustness check
This section presents a robustness check regarding the issue of how to best characterize
monetary policy during a period encompassing also UMP shocks which may have affected the
systemic risk-taking channel. There is lack of agreement in the literature as to how to characterize
UMP shocks. Recently, some authors have even argued that there is “perfect substitutability”
between CMP and UMP, which among other, has the effect of reducing the significance of longstanding concerns about the zero low-bound nominal interest rate constraint. Debortoli et al
(2018) suggest this is the case for the US. This paper is broadly consistent with that view also for
the euro area, with the qualifications made above.
To address this issue the monetary policy rate used is Wu and Xiao (2017) “shadow rate”. Overall,
while broadly consistent with the results obtained earlier, impulse-response functions seem less
economically significant. A loosening of monetary policy has the expected effect of increasing the
EA GDP cyclical component, rising the HICP, depreciating the nominal effective exchange rate,
reducing unit labor costs and inducing a small current account deficit. The effect on GDP is muted.
Loan demand increases while loan supply standards and factors loosen due to the fall in funding
costs. The Eonia-MRO and the ECB balance sheet change are not statistically different from zero.
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Long-term rates are broadly stable.24 Volatility falls as reflected in the VIX. The stock market index
rises driven notably by the industrial sector while the banking sector index does not change
significantly.
Impulse-response functions are broadly similar to those of CMP and UMP shocks. There are four
noteworthy differences, however. First, unit labor costs behave as expected falling marginally
during about 6 quarters, and the fall is thus less persistent than in the case of the CMP and UMP
shocks. Second, while a CMP shock worsens the banking sector stock price index and an UMP
shock improves it, the shadow rate shock has virtually no significant effects on it. Third, the ECB
balance sheet is not affected significantly as it is following a CMP shock. Finally, compared to the
UMP shock, while qualitatively similar, there are significant quantitative differences; in particular,
the effect on output and prices is more muted and capital flows are broadly unaffected. These
results are consistent with those obtained for the US by Wu and Xia (2016) using the shadow
rate.
The impulse response functions that regard systemic risk measures broadly confirm the results
following CMP and UMP shocks. Systemic risk in the form of a common shock to the banking
sector or contagion, both short-term and conditional forward, declines although such decline is
less pronounced for measures of systemic risk associated with contagion and interdependence.
The increase in the banking sector vulnerability as reflected in the common component of the
forward conditional PAO measure of systemic risk (PAO_LT_CC) as a result of the monetary
policy easing is confirmed, albeit it is economically less significant. In addition, and in contrast
with previous results, a monetary policy easing also increases the banking sector vulnerability as
reflected in the conditional common component of the short-term PAO (PAO_ST_CC).
Therefore, impulse response functions obtained using Wu and Xia’s “shadow rate” broadly
confirm previously obtained results following the CMP and UMP shocks using the Eonia rate and
the ECB balance sheet, respectively.

24

The absence of statistically significant effects on the Eonia-MRO spread, the ECB balance sheet and the long-term
interest rate is perhaps unsurprising given that Wu and Xia’s “shadow rate” is a term-structure of interest rate model
that encapsulates by construction all present and expected information on yields. The government bond lower bound
consists of the regime-switching policy lower bound and a non-constant spread and their estimated model maximizes
the likelihood of fitting the six-month-ahead and one-to-two-year-ahead forward rates.
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Figure 4 – Monetary Policy Shocks using Wu and Xia’s Shadow Rate and Systemic Risk-taking

Note 1: JPoD accounts for joint probability of default, SFM for banking system fragility measure, BSI for bank stability
index and PAO for probability that at least one bank will default given that one specific bank already defaulted. ST
accounts for short term or 1 year, LT for the conditional forward probability of the respective systemic risk measure,
and CC for the common component of the respective systemic risk measure.
Note 2: Impulse responses refer to the level of the variables except in the case of price and wage series as they refer
to annualized quarterly growth rates. The euro area (EA) GDP cyclical component is in percent.
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8. Conclusions and policy implications
The abundant empirical evidence available on the significance of the risk-taking channel of
monetary policy is not sufficient to be concerned about the possibility of a monetary policy tradeoff between price stability and financial stability. Systemic risk in the banking sector, while
operating in the same way the traditional risk-taking channel of monetary policy does, i.e. via
banks’ balance sheets, profitability and leverage, in order to be properly measured, it also requires
the inclusion of contagion, interconnectedness, lending standards, time-varying correlations and
feedback effects between asset prices and banks’ balance sheets. The several dimensions of
systemic risk have to be taken into account to be able to draw robust policy implications.
Impulse-response functions following CMP and UMP shocks display a decline in systemic risk
measured in its first two forms, both in the short term and in the medium term, although it takes
longer for contagion-related systemic risk measures to fall. Associated PDs also fall. However,
the presence of systemic-risk taking in the euro area banking sector during both the CMP and
UMP period is clear. It takes notably its third form with an increase in the banking sector’s
vulnerability via contagion and interconnectedness. Banks’ balance sheets do not account for the
full transmission from (micro) risk-taking to systemic risk-taking, however, stressing the
importance of accounting for the non-linearities and feedback effects typical of financial markets.
From the perspective of the micro risk-taking channel of monetary policy, the results of the paper
fall into two categories. First, results for CMP and UMP shocks suggest that, at least for the 30
well-capitalized largest euro area banking groups used in this study, the pass-through and the
risk shifting mechanisms of the risk-taking channel have largely offset themselves during the
sample period. Instead, the search-for-yield mechanism of the risk-taking channel à la Rajan
(2006) is obviously reflected in the slow build-up of vulnerabilities that the systemic risk measure
PAO common component displays.
Second, systemic risk build-up in the form of contagion and interconnectedness following a
“signaling shock” is consistent not only with a slow build-up of banks’ vulnerability, but also with
a situation in which banks may reduce monitoring following the downward pressure of persistently
low interest rates on their gross returns.
These results highlight the importance of extending this study to non-bank financial intermediaries
holding long-term liabilities and short-term assets, such as pension funds, and to insurance
companies and investment funds as well. This is what the ECB quotes above indicate.
The main policy implication of these results is that a persistently accommodative monetary policy
may drive a monetary authority with a price stability mandate to consider a possible trade-off with
financial stability. Several options open up, but discussing them goes beyond the scope of this
paper. However, without changing existing monetary policy frameworks to accommodate the
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possible trade-off, the results do suggest, at a minimum, that the coordination between monetary
and macro-prudential policies requires serious consideration.
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Appendix I: Systemic Risk Measures
The systemic risk measures used in this paper are based on Segoviano’s (2006) CIMDO or
Consistent Information Multivariate Density Optimization, Segoviano and Goodhart’s (2009) and
Radev (2012). However, given that those measures do not cover the slow build-up of
vulnerabilities over time that may unravel disorderly, banks’ marginal PDs and systemic risk
measures are related to a broad set of macro-financial variables that drive them by using the Forni
et al (2000) Generalized Dynamic Factor model (GDFM). The multivariate density that results
from the CIMDO and the GDFM thus contains all the necessary information, coherently
integrated, to estimate measures of financial system systemic credit risk that are consistent with
the ECB’s (2009) categorization of the three forms of systemic risk referred to above. Default
probabilities are estimated using Delianedis and Geske (2003) compound option-based structural
credit risk model, which allows to estimate neutral probabilities of default at the end of year one
and forward neutral default probabilities conditional on not having defaulted at year one. The
systemic risk measures using the PDs at end of year one are labeled _ST and the forward PDs
conditional on not having defaulted at end of year one are labeled _LT.
The first form of systemic risk is a common shock that affects the whole financial sector and gets
transmitted to the real economy. The first measure one is the joint Probability of Distress (JPoD)
or the probability that all banks become distressed, and the second one is a modified version of
the Banking System Fragility measure suggested by Radev (2012). Assuming for simplicity a
banking system made of three banks whose asset value processes are characterized by the
random variables x, y, and z, this measure is calculated as follows:
+ + +

JPoD = x y z p( x, y, z )dxdydz .
xd xd xd

The JPoD describes the upper part of a distribution over its default-threshold xdx , xdy or xdz ,
respectively.
The System Fragility Measure or SFM is the CIMDO-derived probability of at least two financial
institutions getting distressed jointly. Given that this is an unconditional measure, it represents the
general vulnerability of the financial sector to systemic events; it represents the systemic distress
potential. The SFM implies summing up the following unconditional joint probabilities:
𝑦

𝑦

𝑆𝐹𝑀 = 𝑃(𝑋 ≥ 𝜒𝑑𝑥 , 𝑌 ≥ 𝜒𝑑 ) + 𝑃(𝑋 ≥ 𝜒𝑑𝑥 , 𝑍 ≥ 𝜒𝑑𝑧 ) + 𝑃(𝑌 ≥ 𝜒𝑑 , 𝑍 ≥ 𝜒𝑑𝑧 )
𝑦

+ 𝑃(𝑋 ≥ 𝜒𝑑𝑥 + 𝑌 ≥ 𝜒𝑑 , 𝑍 ≥ 𝜒𝑑𝑧 ).
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The SFM describes the part of the posterior distribution where distress occurs because at least
two among X, Y and Z go over their respective distress-thresholds xdx , xdy or xdz .
The third measure of the first form of systemic risk is the Bank Stability Index or BSI. This
measures the case in which a bank becomes distressed following a common shock. The BSI
measures the expected number of financial institutions that will become distressed conditional
on any one financial institution having become distressed. When the BSI=1, the linkages across
financial institutions are minimal. The measure can be written as follows:
𝑦

𝐵𝑆𝐼 =

𝑃(𝑋 ≥ 𝜒𝑑𝑥 ) + 𝑃(𝑌 ≥ 𝜒𝑑 ) + 𝑃(𝑍 ≥ 𝜒𝑑𝑧 )
𝑦

1 − 𝑃(𝑋 < 𝜒𝑑𝑥 , 𝑌 < 𝜒𝑑 , 𝑍 < 𝜒𝑑𝑧 )

.

Alternatively, this measure could be interpreted as a measure of pure contagion as well, if it
were assumed that the shock is idiosyncratic.
The second form of systemic risk is an idiosyncratic shock followed by contagion. To proxy it,
the probability that at least one bank becomes distressed given that a specific bank, or group of
banks has already become distressed is calculated (PAO). The measure shows the likelihood
that an idiosyncratic shock to a bank is propagated to the rest of the financial sector and ends
up affecting the real economy. Assuming a financial system of four financial institutions for
illustrative purposes (i.e., X, Y, R, and Z), and that financial institution Z becomes distressed,
the measure is calculated as follows:
𝑃𝐴𝑂 = 𝑃(𝑋/𝑍) + 𝑃(𝑅/𝑍) + 𝑃(𝑌/𝑍) − [𝑃(𝑋 ∩ 𝑅/𝑍) + 𝑃(𝑋 ∩ 𝑌/𝑍) + 𝑃(𝑅 ∩ 𝑌/𝑍)]
+ 𝑃(𝑋 ∩ 𝑅 ∩ 𝑌 / 𝑍).
The third form of systemic credit risk manifests itself in more subtle way via the build-up of
vulnerabilities, often latent, over time, and it clearly is more difficult to measure. Combining the
CIMDO measures to the GDFM applied to a large macro-financial database with structural credit
risk models allows to measure changes in the bnaking sector vulnerabilities (Jin and Nadal De
Simone, 2014).
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Appendix II
Figure A.1 – Balance Sheet of the European Central Bank
4,500,000
4,000,000
3,500,000
3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000

1,000,000
500,000
-

MRO

LTRO

FINE TUNN. REV. OPER.

MLF

CREDIT MARG. CALLS

SECUR. FOR MP

OTHER SECURITIES

GGDEBT

OTHER ASSETS

TOTAL ASSETS

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406536

40
Appendix III – Impulse Responses of Supply and Fiscal Policy Shocks, 200Q4-2017Q2
This Appendix briefly presents the impulse response functions of supply and fiscal shocks from
the estimation using the “shadow rate”. They are broadly consistent with standard macroeconomic
theory. The results from the estimation using CMP and UMP are largely similar with the exception
that the supply shocks impulse responses on output and unit labor costs in the CMP are less
persistent.
Supply shocks increase output and tend to reduce the HICP. The nominal effective exchange rate
depreciates and the long-term rate declines. There are no changes in the volatility (VIX) and the
stock market improves across all sectors. Loan demand increases and some improvement in loan
supply conditions and factors is visible. Both exports and imports rise and a negative current
account balance appears about 6 quarters after the shock as output expansion advances.
Figure A.2 – Supply Shocks

Fiscal policy shocks increase output and open a positive cyclical gap. However, the positive
activity effect of fiscal shocks lasts only half the time that the positive activity effect supply shocks
last. Fiscal policy shocks produce a larger and more rapid current account deficit instead, largely
because consumer prices rise and the exchange rate has a short-lived depreciation. Lending
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conditions tighten and the stock market displays a muted positive reaction driven by industrial
stocks. The long-term rate rises significantly.
Figure A.3 – Fiscal Policy Shocks
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